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I. INTRODUCTION
People with disabilities have long harbored a silent dream of
equality, which has recently erupted into a demand for equal citizen-
ship. Its realization has been frustrated by perceptions of difference-
both real and imagined-as well as by formalistic rules that reaffirm
the distinctions between those with disabilities and those temporarily
without such attributes. Its achievement presumes a deconstruction
of that difference, through an adjusted awareness of our fragility and
the reform of those legal rules that perpetuate distinctions, including
doctrines designed to protect people from the disadvantaging conse-
quences of disability.'
Although the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is firmly
rooted in our legal tradition, its application to persons with disabili-
* Steven J. Schwartz, J.D. cum laude Harvard University 1971, B.A. Cornell University
1968. This article is dedicated to those with disabilities who are denied the joy of choice.
1. While this Article will refer to all persons with disabilities, the primary victims of these
disadvantages and the subjects of incompetency determinations are individuals with mental
disabilities. These disabilities are usually serious or complicated impairments, although they
may be temporary, such as the case of an individual experiencing an acute and disorienting
phase of an emotional illness, or they may be permanent, such as the situation with individuals
with profound retardation or traumatic head injuries. While the duration of the disability is at
least theoretically irrelevant to the assessment of competency, the severity of the disability
clearly is not.
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ties has generated considerable debate and unresolved confusion. The
Supreme Court has assumed that such equality is both elusive and
unattainable, given the inherent differences between those with disa-
bilities and those without.2 The Congress has recently adopted the
opposite assumption, although not without some qualifications and
concessions.3 The common law has clearly tilted towards recognizing
and even constructing inequality for persons with mental disabilities,
through rules that allow marriages to be voided, families to be broken,
contractual obligations to be excused, wills to be negated, and deci-
sionmaking authority over fundamental liberty and property interests
to be transferred to third persons. Similarly, the criminal law assumes
that it is a conceptual imperative to stay its process and excuse its
verdict, where a defendant's disability is deemed severe.
Whatever the perspective or vision, the undeniable reality is that,
in at least critical respects, persons with disabilities are neither exactly
the same as, nor fully equal to, those who, at the present time, lack
such disabilities. Yet this reality co-exists with the fundamental
promise of equal citizenship under the law. The relevant inquiry thus
becomes whether, or more properly to what extent, legal construc-
tions may properly reinforce these differences, even for benevolent
purposes.
The doctrine of legal competency is perhaps the most pervasive
and invasive distinction between persons with disabilities and those
who temporarily lack such conditions. It classifies all citizens into
two distinctly separate and differently entitled groups: those who are
deemed capable of acting knowingly, and those who are deemed
unable to do so. The doctrine establishes a hierarchy of personhood,
with the attributes of full citizenship vested only in those who satisfy a
2. Justice White, speaking for the majority in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985), described persons with mental retardation in somewhat
pejorative terms: "They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects .... "
3. In enacting the recent Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-
12213 (1991), the Congress identified equality as one of the primary purposes of the statute,
but then recognized that special assistance, reasonable accommodations, and program
modifications might be needed to ensure equal opportunity and access to persons with
disabilities.
4. The concept of competency is not limited to persons with disabilities. It is a doctrine
rooted in the common law, originating from a benevolent but paternalistic determination of
the English Crown to protect all subjects not capable of ensuring their own welfare nor
asserting their own interests. See SAMUEL BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 435-36 (3d ed. 1985). Historically, such status-related distinctions were found to
inhere in race, gender, and lineage. See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE (1990). Even today, society accepts these distinctions as appropriate for age,
both inherently for minors and eventually for seniors. While the concerns expressed and the
reforms proposed herein could apply with similar force to other classes, the implications for
persons other than those with disabilities are beyond the scope of this Article.
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standard of mental fitness. For those declared less capable, elemen-
tary choices concerning liberty, property, and bodily privacy can be,
and frequently are, wholly restricted. Political rights and civic
responsibilities can be effectively nullified. In the guise of benevolent
protectionism, people with disabilities may be rendered nonpersons
and relegated to a status of dependency, with full assurance that their
views and actions will not implicate them in difficulty nor subject
them to any consequences-even those which they reasonably seek
and understandably prefer.
It is worth asking, from the perspective of those with disabilities,'
what would be the effect of pursuing a vision of full equality, with the
necessary consequence that certain legal protections, limitations, and
preferences would have to fall. One possible ramification of such a
strategy would be the abolition or drastic curtailment of certain juris-
prudential concepts such as the doctrine of competency.
While competency is allegedly a neutral construct, designed to
classify citizens according to some cognitive and intellectual standard,
incompetency is virtually synonymous with mental disability. Thus,
although not all persons with disabilities are incompetent, no one can
be declared to lack the ability to make decisions without simultane-
ously qualifying as a "individual with a disability" under federal law.
It is similarly significant that the competency standard which sepa-
rates and distinguishes people is vague, subjective, and difficult to
apply, thereby providing little comfort that the classification system is
either accurate or consistent. As such, competency has become the
most pervasive legal concept for differentiating persons with mental
disabilities from those not so labeled.
Abolishing this doctrine is a radical approach for deconstructing
this difference. Abolition is grounded in a view that legal principles
which establish or reinforce difference should be examined in relation-
ship to those traditional values and common practices which affect all
citizens, rather than through a narrow lens that focuses only on disa-
bility. When applied to a wide range of substantive rights and rela-
tionships, the implications are impressive, intriguing, and perhaps
alarming. A rule of law lacking a concept of competency would have
no doctrinal foundation for protecting or differentiating persons with
mental disabilities.
5. That perspective is not articulated by any one spokesperson nor elucidated in a formal
position statement of any one organization; rather it is inferred from the thousands of inmates,
consumers, and friends with disabilities with whom I have come in contact over the past two
decades. This perspective is both a consensus of my clients and the passionately presented
viewpoint of associations created and controlled by persons with disabilities.
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This Article explores the question of whether, to what extent,
and at what cost such a reform should be pursued. It argues that,
with respect to the assertion or affirmative exercise of fundamental
rights through actions initiated by a person with a disability, the doc-
trine of competency results in unnecessary restrictions, has deleteri-
ous societal as well as individual consequences which outweigh any
paternalistic benefits, and therefore should be abolished. On the other
hand, where a third party or the state initiates actions against a person
with a disability that would restrict or invade individual rights, a nar-
rowly circumscribed application of a competency rule should be
retained.6 Finally, the protective justifications for the competency
doctrine may retain some vitality where a person with a disability
who neither affirmatively acts nor is acted upon is at imminent risk of
physical harm as a direct result of her inaction related to a cognitive
impairment. The Article analyzes the impact of these reformist rules
in the following five substantive areas: (1) political rights: voting; (2)
civil rights: marriage; (3) personal rights: bearing and raising chil-
dren; (4) criminal process: competency to stand trial, criminal
responsibility, plea bargaining, and sentencing; and (5) privacy rights:
bodily integrity and medical treatment. Finally, it attempts to ana-
lyze the implications of this revisionist proposal for the general law of
guardianship.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE REFORMIST RULE
A. Political Rights. Voting
After almost two centuries of denying persons with disabilities all
access to the electoral process, many states now permit some citizens
with disabilities to vote under some circumstances.7 However, most
states still preclude persons under any form of guardianship or those
who are otherwise considered incapable of informed choice, by virtue
6. The possibility, of course, exists for addressing the negative consequences of the
doctrine through a variety of less drastic alternatives, such as heightening the substantive
standards for incompetency, enhancing the procedural protections in competency
determinations, creating degrees of restrictions associated with different levels of cognitive
impairments or the varying importance of the interests involved, or even experimenting with
more respectful guidelines to be applied by alternative decisionmakers. A detailed analysis of
these alternatives has been explored by several commentators. See, e.g., Lori A. Steigel et al.,
Durable Powers of Attorney: An Analysis of State Statutes, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 690
(1991); Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES L. &
MED. 131 (1985). A similar analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. None of these
options, however, address the basic assumption underlying the competency doctrine: that
limitations in cognitive capacity can and should deny a person with a disability decisionmaking
autonomy and the opportunity to enjoy one's choices.
7. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 445-46.
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of their mental condition, from exercising the franchise.8 The ration-
ale for this exclusion is often confused and always difficult to sustain.
Presumably, the prohibition is intended to prevent those deemed to be
without sufficient capacity to properly determine their own interests
and to affect the interests of others.
Arguably, in promoting a regime of equality under the law, no
compelling state interest exists in denying the vote to persons with
disabilities who are possibly or even clearly incapable of compre-
hending all aspects of the electoral process. Using a standard of the
average voter as the reference for assessing the acceptability of an
exclusionary rule, one would have to determine what level of informa-
tion and understanding is the bare minimum to qualify for becoming
a qualified voter.'
There is, of course, an important value in safeguarding the demo-
cratic process against corruption or undue influence. But the means
selected for achieving this legitimate goal should be equally applicable
to all citizens and not have a discriminatory impact on a selected sub-
group. This concern, even if specially relevant to persons with mental
disabilities, can be addressed through less restrictive means which do
not wholly preclude persons with more severe impairments from all
participation in the political process.
The high value traditionally placed on civic responsibility and
membership in the body politic is directly undermined by denying any
class of citizens the franchise. The minimal cost to the democratic
process of an occasional uninformed or even unintelligible vote by a
person with a serious mental disability is outweighed by the stated
societal interest in including all persons with disabilities in the polit-
ical process. Thus, abolishing the doctrine of competency as a stan-
dard for restricting the affirmative exercise of the fundamental right
8. Id. at 445. In a seminal case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the
claim of a local registrar that all residents of a state school for persons with retardation in the
town were defacto under the guardianship of the institution's superintendent and thus barred
from voting. Boyd v. Registrars of Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1975). When counsel for
the residents suggested at oral argument that the court strike down the state statute which
disenfranchised all persons under court appointed guardianship, regardless of their actual
ability to participate in the electoral process, members of the Court inquired whether any
standard of decisionmaking capacity was permissible. Id. at 631-32. Pointing to the voting
public's general lack of familiarity with the substantive positions of their preferred candidates,
the commonplace practice of voting a straight party ticket, and the notorious Boston tradition
of voting early and often for one's favorite politician, counsel responded in the negative. The
court nevertheless declined the invitation to declare the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 632-33.
9. Clearly, literacy tests or similar assessments of civic knowledge are impermissible.
Presumably, questioning by registrars or electoral officials to measure cognitive capacity,
intelligence, reasoning ability, or even understanding of the responsibilities of officeholders
would be equally suspect.
1993]
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to vote would result in little burden to the efficient operation of the
government and would significantly facilitate the equal citizenship of
persons with disabilities.' 0 Where an individual can participate in the
electoral process by selecting a candidate or position, the issue of
competency should be irrelevant to the person's right to vote.
B. Civil Rights: Marriage
Marriage is perhaps the most intimate and socially valued rela-
tionship which is subject to legal regulation. Majoritarian values of
family and property have commonly dictated the parameters of the
law of marriage, at certain times even barring devalued classes from
entering officially sanctioned relationships. " Despite the general civil
right to marry, established limitations still exist in most states1 2 which
preclude disabled individuals with limited mental capacity from mar-
rying, or at least that create grounds for voiding a marriage, because
of their inability to fully comprehend the consequences of their com-
mitment. Such restrictions presumably serve to safeguard property
interests of the partners with disabilities, although the non-disabled
spouse often invokes allegations of incompetency to avoid the legal,
economic, and spiritual burden of divorce.
Assessing competency to marry is a precarious business. Avoid-
ing discriminatory impact is even more delicate. Using as a reference
the average husband or wife's understanding of the consequences of
the marriage contract, 13 it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the
minimum level of information and understanding that is necessary to
qualify for loving and living with another in a relationship sanctified
by the state. Thus, excluding only persons with mental disabilities
from the challenges and rewards of officially endorsed, intimate rela-
tionships requires a distinction that is problematic to apply and even
harder to justify.
It is also difficult to discern any compelling state interest in deny-
ing certain persons with severe disabilities the right to have personal,
legally recognized relationships. A legitimate societal interest exists
10. A parallel claim could be advanced for other disenfranchised groups, such as minors
and aliens. An assessment of the merits of such claim is beyond the scope of this Article.
11. Jim Crow laws prohibited interracial marriages in most states for over a century, until
finally invalidated not long ago. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Similar restrictions
applied to persons with disabilities. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 507-09.
12. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 507-09. For a list of each state's provisions on
marriage, see id. at 532-38 (Table 9.1).
13. Marriage vows involve a permanent, life-long commitment to care for and tend to
one's partner, through various conditions and without limitation. Many people now
commonly accept that almost half of all marriages formally disavow such a commitment.
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in protecting against suggestibility and undue influence, although
these concerns primarily affect the property rights, rather than the
family and emotional interests involved in marriage. Other less
restrictive and equally protective options are available to avoid deplet-
ing assets of spouses with disabilities, such as pre-nuptial agreements,
separate ownership of property, marital trusts, and limitations on
spousal liability. Moreover, these same risks inhere in a wide variety
of personal, economic, political, and legal relationships characterized
by unequal bargaining power, desperation, differential expectations,
and conflicting cultural traditions such as arranged marriages in west-
ern society. It is highly questionable whether these factors have any
unique application to persons with disabilities or even to persons
deemed incapacitated by virtue of their disability.
The value traditionally placed on family and personal relation-
ships outweighs the cost to the other partner of an occasional unin-
formed living arrangement by a person with a mental disability. 4
Relieving an entire class of persons from all personal and legal
responsibility for their social relationships, by reason of disability,
also entails a significant collective cost. Competency is a weak justifi-
cation for assessing an individual's readiness for formal emotional
commitments or permanent familial bonds. Abolishing it as a stan-
dard for entering or voiding a marriage would impair few valid inter-
ests and enhance numerous others. Thus, persons with disabilities
should not be restricted from affirmatively exercising the civil right to
marry, solely as a result of the nature of their handicap or even its
effect on their supposed understanding of the meaning of marriage.
C. Fundamental Personal Rights: Procreating and Parenting
A long and shameful legal history has developed of precluding
persons with mental disabilities, even those who are not cognitively
impaired, from exercising their rights to procreate.' 5 Compulsory
sterilization laws enacted in most states during the early part of this
century in response to eugenic theories of retardation equated mental
disability with incompetency. 16 In the name of ensuring the purity of
the race, they mandated that women with disabilities, and particularly
those living in public institutions or otherwise supported by the public
14. Divorce is the obvious, acceptable alternative to such an arrangement. Even here,
special rules may apply where one partner has or had a mental disability. See BRAKEL ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 510-12.
15. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927). For an enlightening exposition of
the conspiratorial history which led to this decision, see Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations,
No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 31 (1985).
16. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 521-24.
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fisc, surrender their procreative capabilities. In an effort to correct
this history of discrimination and abuse, a few states enacted new laws
that totally banned the sterilization of persons with retardation,
thereby denying them both the choice of whether or not to procreate,
as well as the same consent options and mechanisms as are afforded to
temporarily able-bodied women. 17 Other jurisdictions endorsed new
statutory schemes that permit the sterilization of disabled women, but
establish classifications and different procedural protections for those
lacking the ability to understand the implications of sterilization.'
An uncodified tradition of denying all persons with mental disa-
bilities, other than those with minor impairments, the right to raise
their own children has also developed.' 9 Through child protection
laws that authorize state officials to remove children from their par-
ents and to terminate parental rights when the best interests of the
child allegedly require, persons with mental disabilities-particularly
those who lack a sophisticated understanding of child rearing respon-
sibilities-regularly are forced to surrender their children to foster
placements or adoption agencies.20
Given the fundamental rights of procreation and parenting, only
a colorable state interest exists in denying persons with disabilities,
including those with limited decisionmaking capacity, the right to
have personal, intimate, and legally recognized familial relationships.
No compelling interest exists for forcibly foreclosing procreation
opportunities, based solely on a finding of disability or limited mental
capacity.2' There is a legitimate concern for protecting children from
parental abuse and neglect. But this concern extends to all citizens,
without regard to the parent's (or child's) label of disability or inca-
pacity. In fact, it may be statistically more relevant in families of pov-
erty, parents who themselves suffered abuse or neglect, or parents
with a history of substance abuse. Yet none of these relevant predi-
cates, in and of themselves, could justify a sterilization or parental
termination decision by the state. Rather, verifiable factual informa-
tion of specific abusive or neglectful actions must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence before the fundamental right to rear one's
17. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1985).
18. See, e.g., In re Mary Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 724 (Mass. 1982). For a list of each state's
provisions on sterilization, see BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 552-58 (Tables 9.5, 9.6).
19. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally
Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1249-50 (1990).
20. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 516-18.
21. See Helvey v. Rendour, 407 N.E.2d 17 (IlL. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel. E. & B. v. J.T.,
578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978).
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children can be curtailed.22 The existence of a disability or limitations
in decisionmaking capacity simply cannot be equated with abuse or
neglect.23
Predicting who will not be a responsible parent is a troubling
inquiry. Relying on the label of disability or incapacity aggravates the
probability of error. And acting on such speculations to wholly pre-
clude procreation is a discredited response grounded on a prejudicial
premise. Even assessing what degree of disability or incapacity is
likely to result in neglect is elusive, as evidenced by the near random
results in parental termination proceedings conducted in various
lower state courts.24 Using as a standard the average parent, it is
problematic to determine the precise level of information and under-
standing that constitutes the minimum abilities necessary to qualify
for caring for one's child. Whatever these abilities, they clearly
should not be focused on a parent's disability or decisionmaking
capacity, but instead on the more profound, personal, and relevant
criteria concerning the parent's ability to care, protect, and love her
child.
While abolition may not be as convincing here as it is in the areas
of political and civil rights, a competency test has limited utility and
substantial costs in the affirmative exercise of fundamental personal
rights. The substantial value traditionally placed on the rights of pro-
creation and family integrity probably outweighs the cost to others of
an occasional problematic living arrangement involving a parent with
a mental disability. Where such parent engages in actual abuse or
neglect of the child's basic needs, then these facts-and not her disa-
bility or cognitive developmental level-should determine whether
parental rights are terminated.
D. The Criminal Process: Competency, Responsibility, and
Sentencing
The criminal process has been especially solicitous to and stig-
matizing of persons with disabilities. It has devised numerous doc-
trines to preserve the conceptual integrity of the criminal law and to
avoid trying or incarcerating persons with cognitive impairments. In
22. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence is needed to
terminate parental rights).
23. No empirical evidence exists that parental neglect is related in any demonstrable way
to either disability or cognitive incapacities. On the contrary, much evidence exists that even
persons with severe mental retardation make good parents. Hayman, supra note 19, at 1219-
22. There is also a significant cost to relieving a class of persons from all responsibility for
their children, solely by reason of disability.
24. Id. at 1234-41.
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order to ensure that defendants can participate in the process for
assessing guilt and exacting retribution, it has constructed the concept
of competency to stand trial. To promote the purposes of punish-
ment, it has precluded a finding of criminal responsibility for defend-
ants not capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of their actions.
Courts have struggled to adopt the moral principles of intent,
capacity, and responsibility to the pleading, sentencing, and incarcer-
ation phases of the criminal process. Some have denied individuals
with severe impairments the freedom to plead guilty, even when doing
so reflects an honest confession of responsibility or a practical assess-
ment of the risks of conviction.25 Others have attempted to articulate
principles of decency that would only preclude defendants with cer-
tain severe disabilities from being subjected to particularly offensive
punishments, such as the death penalty.2 6 Finally, courts have fre-
quently taken solace in the notion of treatment to legitimate indefinite
institutionalization in a rehabilitation facility, in lieu of term-limited
incarceration in a correctional setting.27 But in each phase of the
criminal process, disabled defendants remain segregated by a criterion
of competency as the justification for more lenient though potentially
more harmful dispositions. While the ostensible purpose of these
exceptions is to accommodate certain disabling conditions, the princi-
ples actually reflect a preoccupation with the doctrinal purity of the
process. And the practical consequences of lengthy confinement in
forensic institutions often overshadow the benign motive of protecting
individuals with serious disabilities from penal incarceration.
Much has been written concerning the relevance and utility of
these exceptions, with a few commentators suggesting their abolition,
but most others heralding their importance.28 Without revisiting the
complexity of these arguments, it is worth asking a wholly different
question than that which has thus far shaped the debate: what is the
consequence to persons with serious disabilities of treatment different
than that of all other defendants and of exemption-in principle
though not necessarily in practice-from the responsibility for their
actions?
25. E.g., Commonwealth v. Delverde, 496 N.E.2d 1357, 1362 (Mass. 1986).
26. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315 (1990).
27. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 725.
28. See Norval Morris, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally I1, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV.
477 (1982); Stephen J. Morse, Treating Crazy People Less Specially, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 353
(1988); Symposium, Current Issues in Mental Disability Law, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. (1987);
Symposium, The Mentally Retarded in the Criminal Justice System, 41 ARK. L. REV. 723
(1988); Symposium, Perspectives on Mental Illness and Mental Handicaps, 14 RUTGERS L.J.
233 (1983); Samuel Silverman, Note, Mental Aberration and Postconviction Sanctions, 15
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1219 (1981).
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Surely, persons with disabilities have an interest in avoiding
criminal trials, adjudications of guilt, incarceration, and particularly
death sentences. But that interest is not related primarily to, nor is it
justified by, any limitation in intellectual understanding. Instead, it is
an interest in physical liberty that all defendants share. Abolition of
the concepts of competency in the criminal process undoubtedly
would limit the strategic options available to attorneys for disabled
defendants, but no more so than those that currently exist for all
other defendants and with no greater cost to the actual functioning of
the process.29 Individuals with disabilities also have an interest in
being, and being perceived as being, responsible citizens who are capa-
ble of honoring a social compact to respect the rights and privileges of
all other citizens, or to bear the consequences for failing to do. Excep-
tions to social norms crafted to reflect their inability to respect those
common rights or to be held accountable for their actions severely
undermines that perception of responsibility. If given a choice to
devise law or policy, the community of persons with disabilities would
not likely exchange freedom from punishment for a selected few, for
the opprobrium and stigma that has attended the legal conclusion
that disability is properly an excuse from responsibility.30 Not sur-
prisingly, that conclusion fuels a public concern that persons with dis-
abilities are fundamentally different, incapable of being trusted
neighbors, and unworthy of the attributes of equal citizenship. One
might even question whether a particular individual with a severe dis-
ability would necessarily exchange the strict protections of the crimi-
nal process for the paternalistic informality of the mental health
system and the indefinite deprivation of freedom in a mental
institution.
E. Privacy Rights: Bodily Integrity
Historically, persons with mental disabilities either were consid-
ered not to possess privacy interests in bodily integrity or were
deemed to have waived such interests in exchange for the state's
beneficence in protecting their welfare. Thus, governmental authori-
ties traditionally would determine whether and where medical care,
mental health treatment, or habilitation services were required, with-
out regard to the individual's authorization, preferences, or even
29. Several jurisdictions currently permit defendants who have been found incompetent to
stand trial to submit evidence to prove their innocence, and if acquitted at a mini-trial, to have
all criminal charges dismissed. E.g., MASS. GEN. L., ch. 123, § 17 (1986).
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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physical compliance.31 Not surprising, public institutions and their
employees customarily approved the administration of most interven-
tions deemed necessary, beneficial, or possibly useful.32 Private hospi-
tals and community clinicians were less likely to conduct the same
inquiry for persons with disabilities that they commonly afforded to
all other citizens under the law, in order to obtain informed consent
before engaging in a procedure that otherwise constituted an invasion
of the individual's privacy.
The controversial nature and disturbing effects of certain psychi-
atric treatments prompted a concerned public to legislate limited
exceptions to this broad scale practice of ignoring-and, in fact, never
even soliciting-the views of persons with disabilities. Review proce-
dures in lieu of the traditional consent process were enacted for
electro-convulsive treatment (electroshock) and cranial lobotomies.33
While the alternative procedures rarely mandated an inquiry into the
individual's preferences, they occasionally required a preliminary
assessment of the person's decisionmaking capacity and usually
required authorization from a substituted decisionmaker, even if the
standard for granting authorization was the person's perceived
"need" for these intrusive interventions.34
The judiciary soon reflected this concern in a series of mostly
state court decisions applying a similar rationale to anti-psychotic
medication.35 While many of these cases spoke only of a right to
31. This history, and the parens patriae rationale allegedly supporting this dispensation
with individual consent, is thoughtfully catalogued by Professor Bruce Winnick in his analysis
of the role of competency in psychiatric medication decisions. Bruce J. Winick, Competency to
Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15
(1991). He explores the competing values of individual autonomy, as reflected in the law of
battery and consent, and the state's responsibility to protect its incompetent citizens. He
suggests that this tension is best reconciled by respecting an individual's choice to accept
treatment, through the application of a lowered standard of competency than customarily
applied through the doctrine of informed consent. It is difficult to understand why the
fundamental principle of autonomy should not compel the same conclusion with respect to a
treatment refusal as it does for treatment acceptance.
32. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1972) (upholding constitutionality of state statute
allowing superintendent of state facility to decide whether sterilization is in resident's best
interest).
33. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 456-58.
34. Id. at 330-31.
35. See, e.g., Bea v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis. 1983);
Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Reise v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985); In re
Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64 (Ill. 1988); Rogers v. Commissioner of Department of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988); Opinion of the
Justices, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); In re
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refuse certain psychotropic medications, 36 the leading decisions recog-
nized the perversion of history and reinstated the traditional doctrine
of consent for persons with mental disabilities whose physicians
sought to administer psychiatric treatment.3 ' The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court explicitly recognized the inherent right of all
citizens, whether or not competent, to approve any invasion of their
bodily integrity.38 Other courts that adopted this approach provided
the doctrinal foundation for reconstructing the principle of equality in
the provision of medical care. But they simultaneously resurrected
the dilemma of difference inherent in the concept of competency, by
requiring a finding of capacity to make treatment decisions and by
prohibiting individuals with serious mental disabilities and cognitive
impairments from rendering those decisions themselves.
Privacy rights differ in a significant and relevant respect from the
other vestiges of citizenship already discussed. Unlike most political,
civil, family, and criminal rights, which are affirmatively exercised
through actions initiated by the individual, privacy rights seek to pro-
tect citizens from actions brought by the government or other third
parties that are imposed upon the person. More precisely, the compe-
tency question relevant to the exercise of most political, civil, family,
and criminal rights involves whether a proposed action by the individ-
ual-such as the exercise of the franchise, the solemnization of a mar-
riage, the bearing and rearing of children, and participation in the
criminal justice process-should be legally honored. A declaration of
incompetency in these areas results in a prohibition on such action
and a restriction on the exercise of these rights. The competency doc-
trine tilts just the other way with respect to fundamental privacy
interests. Disability is not the measure used to restrict the exercise of
a constitutional right or other civil privilege, but rather the element
that is relied upon to prove a waiver of a fundamental right. It deter-
mines whether a proposed action of a third party should proceed
against the protected interests of the individual. A finding of incom-
petency often results in a justification for such action and a concomi-
tant invasion of such rights.39
K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis.
1987).
36. See, e.g., Reise v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
37. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass.
1983).
38. Id. at 317-19.
39. In this respect, it closely parallels basic constitutional protections in the criminal
justice system, such as searches, confessions, and self-incrimination. A similar analysis is
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Privacy matters that involve treatment issues implicate the most
fundamental concerns of bodily integrity and subject the individual to
potentially intrusive, permanent, and painful violations. The aboli-
tion of the competency doctrine with respect to medical care would
have particularly harsh and untoward consequences. If applied with-
out qualification to treatment decisions, it would allow all persons,
including those clearly incapable of authorizing invasions of their
bodily integrity, to be treated whenever their caretakers or profession-
als deemed it appropriate and the person with a disability apparently
concurred or at least did not actively object. The implication of that
reform would be to merely reinstate the regime of inequality and
parens patriae authority that existed for most of the last millennium
and that only recently was deconstructed through doctrines that
sought to honor the inherent worth and rights of all persons with
disabilities.
In order to ensure respect for the values underlying fundamental
privacy rights, a narrowing rather than an abolition of the compe-
tency doctrine is more appropriate. Some meaningful threshold of
understanding should exist before an individual's right to bodily
integrity can be wholly waived. This caveat, when applied to treat-
ment decisions, would require a preliminary inquiry into whether the
person understands the most basic elements of the treatment decision.
If so, the person's decision-whether to accept or reject the proposed
intervention-would be respected. Competency would be retained as
a minimalist inquiry that, if affirmed, would preclude treatment with-
out the individual's assent, but if found lacking, would prevent intru-
sive interventions absent appropriate approval from a substituted
decisionmaker.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFORMIST RULES FOR THE
LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP
The law of guardianship provides the traditional response to alle-
gations of impaired judgment. With its somewhat ambiguous stan-
dards and formalistic procedures, this legal response frequently has
been challenged as arbitrary, unduly restrictive, and unnecessarily
protective.4 ° Although national models exist, state guardianship
appropriate, although perhaps less compelling and in any event more complicated by
competing interests, with respect to the waiver of these fundamental rights.
40. See Sally B. Hurme, Steps to Enhance Guardianship Monitoring, REPORT OF THE
ABA COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY (1991); Annina M. Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianship for
Incompetents: A Strategy for Legal Services Advocates, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 451 (1978);
Roger B. Sherman, Guardianship: Time for Reassessment, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 350 (1980).
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schemes vary widely in scope, process, and effect.4 Reforms have
been proposed that narrow the inquiry and individualize the outcome,
but these proposals assume the legitimacy of the construct and
endorse the acceptability of the classifications. 2
The reform of the doctrine of competency described above would
significantly modify current guardianship law. In many respects,
guardianship would no longer retain its basic purpose, function, or
effect. Legal relationships would not be neatly ordered between those
deemed able and those declared unable to consent. The affirmative
exercise of most political, civil, family, and criminal procedural rights
would not depend on intellectual capacity or simplistic standards of
rationality. In many of these areas, the law of guardianship would be
obsolete.
But in other arenas, such as the protection of privacy interests,
the provision of medical care, and perhaps the preservation of certain
property rights, guardianship models would be retained, albeit in a
narrower and more respectful form. Where third parties' actions
threaten persons with disabilities with invasions of their fundamental
interests or where inaction threatens the individual's physical safety
or property, protective mechanisms such as guardianship and conser-
vatorship have continued utility.
Clear standards of capacity would need to be devised, but they
should not insist on an unduly rigorous demonstration of cognitive
ability. In those instances where some decision has to be made on
behalf of the person with a mental disability, alternative methods,
such as substitute decisionmaking, would be required. To be sure,
difficult questions of alternative decisionmaking must be addressed,
with all the complexities of discerning the individual's preferences,
rendering a meaningful judgment, and appointing a qualified surro-
gate. Special protections would be legitimate only when directly
related to the ability to actually exercise a right.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to formulate a truly egalitarian model of legal rights and
a vision of people with disabilities as full citizens, it is worth asking
whether rights analysis can be reconstructed from the perspective of
individuals with disabilities. Specifically, should our legal system
abandon its preoccupation with the rational person as the sole model
of legal decisionmaking and substitute instead a more flexible appreci-
41. For a list of each state's provisions on guardianship, see BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4,
at 408-24 (Tables 7.3, 7.4).
42. Id. at 386-88.
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ation of personhood that accommodates degrees of cognitive impair-
ments and incapacities?
Under this approach, all citizens, regardless of disability or deci-
sionmaking ability, would possess the same rights and would be sub-
ject to the same basic responsibilities. Neither limitations on the
rights available, nor protections from the responsibilities assumed,
would be imposed on individuals with serious disabilities, any more
than they are for people of color or other disadvantaged minorities.
As long as one can actually exercise a vestige of citizenship, such as
voting and family relationships, or is capable of engaging in an activ-
ity, such as anti-social or criminal behavior, the same rights, responsi-
bilities, and processes would apply to all persons, regardless of the
level and nature of disability. Intellectual capacity would be relevant
only where such physical expression of choice or action is not possible
and where the activity involves an action initiated by a third party
against the individual with a disability in a manner which invades or
impairs fundamental interests.
Such a reform of the doctrine of competency surely would be
radical, perhaps too much so for established social and political insti-
tutions and for long venerated legal rules. But the failure to reform
the doctrine relegates persons with disabilities to a different class of
citizenship and to a lesser sense of personhood. If the consequences of
a common law with a drastically revised rule of competency are prob-
lematic, then the implications of a world classified by cognitive capac-
ity are even more disturbing. The former may present logistical
difficulties and complicate legal relationships, but the latter creates
troubling inequities and fundamentally precludes more important
relationships.
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